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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
Although American consumers are increasingly disconnected from production 
agriculture, there is a surging interested in food and agricultural production methods.  
Popular writers increasingly espouse the merits of local and organic foods, and decry 
“factory farms” and “corporate agriculture” (e.g., see Pollan 2006)  Although such 
concerns are often vague and detached from the realities of modern food production 
practices, such writers often appeal to the intrinsic value consumers apparently ttach to 
small family farmers.  From its onset, it seems that Americans have been enamored with 
an agrarian ideal.  As Thomas Jefferson put it, “Agriculture... is our wisest pursuit, 
because it will in the end contribute most to real wealth, good morals and happiness.”   
In the late 1920s, the U.S. government initiated farm policies to support and 
stabilize farm income through supply controls, deficiency payments, and price floors.  
Other goals have been introduced over the years (e.g., increasing agricultural expo ts and 
promoting the conservation of natural resources), but today’s policies still aim to “save 
the family farm” (Doering and Outlaw 2006).  The persistence of farm policies is no 
doubt partly attributable to the political power of the agricultural lobby, but to have 
existed so long, it seems that farm policies would also have to enjoy some modicum of 
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public support. Indeed, Ellison, Lusk, and Briggeman (2009) recently found, via in-
person interviews in three U.S. cities, that almost 85% of respondents were in favor of the 
U.S. government subsidizing farmers. 
 The general question we ask in this paper is why the public supports or opposes 
farm supports.  A renewed interest in farm policy has emerged, in part, because the 
structure of agriculture has changed drastically from the time farm policies were first 
implemented.  Farm household incomes were once well below non-farm household 
incomes; however, in 2007, the mean income and net worth of farm households exceeded 
their non-farm counterparts by over $15,000 and $500,000, respectively (Harris, et al. 
2008).  Given these structural changes, some argue that farm support programs should be 
changed to remove support for “factory farms” (e.g., Riedl 2007; Grunwald 2007; 
Environmental Working Group 2008).  Even President Obama has been outspoken about 
limiting subsidies to “agribusinesses” (Pulizzi and Boles 2009). Yet, little is known about 
public support for farm policies. To be sure, the public is often uninformed about 
agriculture and farm policy, but in a democracy public opinion is an important input in 
the political and policy making process. That people are often unknowledgeable about 
agriculture also suggests the need to understand how the public reacts to different 
information about the structure of agriculture.   
To our knowledge, only a couple previous studies have analyzed U.S. taxpayer 
support for farm policies. Variyam and Jordan (1991) and Variyam, Jordan, and 
Epperson (1990) used people’s answers to Likert-scale questions elicited in a mail survey 
to examine perceptions of and preferences for agricultural policy among a sample of U.S. 
citizens. They found that people often equate family farms with small farms, nd that 
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people are more supportive of family farms than non-family farms. They found women 
and Democrats were more likely to support farm policies than men and Republicans. 
Rather than asking general Likert questions about support for general farm 
policies, in this paper, we use developments in behavioral and experimental economics to 
provide a framework in which to interpret people’s concerns for others – in our case 
farmers.  Implementing this economic structure allows us to utilize other-rega ding 
behavioral models developed by  Charness and Rabin (2002), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Engelmann and Strobel (2004) to better understand 
why the public supports or opposes farm policy and to predict how the public would vote 
on particular policies involving monetary taxes and payouts to different groups.  Using
the models proposed by these authors, in conjunction with people’s responses to 
particular survey questions, we can identify the extent to which people’s willingness to 
support farm programs is driven by self interest, altruism, or inequality aversion.  To 
these more formal models, we also add a host of attitudinal variables to further identify 
motivations for farm support or opposition. 
The overall purpose of this research is to develop a greater understanding of U.S. 
citizens’ attitudes toward farm support programs. This research uses survey data from a 
random sample of over 1,100 U.S. citizens to determine: (1) the percentage of the 
population that supports or opposes direct payments to farmers; (2) whether support or 
opposition to direct payments depends on the size of farm receiving the payment and/or 
the type of information provided about farm incomes; and (3) whether factors such as 




Rather than asking general Likert questions about support for general farm 
policies, in this paper, we ask people a series of concrete questions related to support for 
direct payments, and by varying the cost of the policy to the individual and the benefit to 
the farmer, we can identify the parameters of the other-regarding behavior model. Given 
these parameter estimates, we can calculate a person’s willingness to pay for policies 
with specific changes in dollar payouts.  Moreover, given the fact that most U.S. citizens 
have little knowledge of agriculture, we study the extent to which information al ers 








Many models have been proposed to explain other-regarding behavior. Motivated by the 
experimental finding that people do not act in a strictly selfish manner, previous studies 
have proposed various models to depict other-regarding preferences.  In perhaps the most 
widely known of these models, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) argue that in addition to self 
interest, people are averse to two types of inequality: advantageous inequality in which 
people derive disutility from being better off than others and disadvantageous inequality 
in which people derive disutility from being worse off than others.  Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000) propose a similar model of inequality aversion, but one in which inequality is 
conceptualized as the extent to which one’s payoff differs from the mean payoff.  
Charness and Rabin (2002) argue that people are concerned about efficiency (i.e., the 
sum of all payouts) and have maxi-min preference (i.e., people want to maximize the 
minimum payoff).     
In this paper, we propose a model based on the insights of Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002).  In particular, consider the utility, Vi, a person 
derives from a direct payment policy that imposes a monetary cost to individual i, Xi, and 
some monetary benefit to two types of family farms on both extremes of the size 
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spectrum: an average payout to each small, XSF, and very large, XVLF, family farmer
1. 
More formally,  
(1) Vi = β0 + β1Xi + βSFXSF + βVLFXVLF + βIA {|Xi-XSF| + |Xi-XVLF|},  
is the utility derived from such a policy which depends on self interest (β1), altruism 
toward small and very large family farms,(βSF and βVLF,  respectively), and aversion to 
inequality (βIA).  The parameter β0 captures all other factors affecting the utility derived 
from a policy not explained by relative monetary payoffs.    
We hypothesize people care about their own monetary well-being, and all else 
equal, prefer to have more money to less (i.e., β1 > 0).  Second, we hypothesize people 
are altruistic toward small farmers and are more altruistic toward small farms than very 
large farms (i.e., βSF > 0 and βSF >βVLF).  Finally, we hypothesize people are averse to 
inequality (i.e., βIA < 0), which is a key theoretical and empirical finding of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999). 
Modeling other-regarding behavior as shown in equation (1) presents some 
advantages and disadvantages when compared to existing models. Equation (1) is more 
general than Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model because it includes the altruism 
parameters, βSF and βVLF , as well as the parameter β0, but is also more restrictive because 
it assumes no difference in aversion to advantageous and disadvantageous inequality.2 
The model also has the ability to somewhat capture preferences for efficiency (as argued 
is important by Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004)) by noting 
                                                          
1
 Here, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the Xs are changes in income and are modeled as payouts either 
received or paid. In our case, Xi is negative because it is a tax paid by the individual to provide the 
payments XSF and XVLF to small and very large farms. 
2 This restriction is somewhat irrelevant in the context of our empirical application as we only ask peo l  
about policies in which they pay some tax amount and f rms receive some benefit.  That is, all monetary 
changes occurring in our survey are such that the individual is in a disadvantageous position relative o the 
farmer in so far as the change in income is concerned.  What matters in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model and 
in our own are changes in relative income not absolute levels of wealth or income.   
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that the utility function includes the sum of all payouts Xi, XSF, and XVLF, weighted by the 
respective selfishness and altruism parameters.  We also note that the formulati n bears 
some similarity to the model in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) because it is posited that 
people care about their cost/benefit relative to the average payoff of the farmer in a given 
group.  Thus, while the model in equation (1) assumes people are unconcerned about the 
distribution of payouts with a farm type, redistributing income from small to large 
farmers might be desirable. 
 Another advantage of equation (1) is the ease with which it can be manipulated to 
show how much tax an individual would be willing to pay to give payments to different 
farm types. Normalizing the utility from a policy’s non-passage to zero, the maximum 
additional tax (or maximum willingness-to-pay (WTP)) individual i would be willing to 
bear such that each small farmer receives XSF and each very larger farmer receives XVLF 
is: 
(2) WTP = [β0 + (βSF + βIA)XSF + (βVLF+ βIA)XVLF ]/(β1 - 2βIA). 
A number of insights can be gleaned from equation (2). First, it can be seen that 
β0 denotes the utility derived from a policy’s passage that is not explained by magnitude 
of payouts to small and large farmers; β0 incorporates other motivations for voting in 
favor a policy to subsidize farmers such as protecting the food supply or preserving the 
beauty of natural resources. In addition, the term (β1 - 2βIA) reflects the marginal utility of 
income which translates the change in utility from the policy’s passage (the term in 
brackets) to dollars. Finally, if people are more concerned about small farmers than 
inequality aversion (i.e., βSF > - βIA) and holding the payoff to very large farmers at $0, 
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the aforementioned hypotheses imply that people will be willing to pay some positive 
amount for a policy in which small farmers benefit (i.e., WTP|XVLF=0 > 0). 
 In describing the model given in equation (1), it was implicitly assumed that we 
were describing the preferences of a single individual with a given informati n set.  
However, preferences are likely to be influenced by the information and knowledge one 
possesses about farms, I, attitudes toward farms and government in general, A, and 
demographics, D.  As such, each of the model parameters, β0,  β1, βSF, βVLF, and βIA is 
likely to depend on I, A, and D.   
One example of information which might alter individuals’ preferences is 
information regarding farm household income.  It is likely that when people see the term 
“small family farm” they are likely to conjure an image of a lower income household.  
However, data from the 2007 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) shows 
the average household income for a small family farm is $69,804 – much higher than the 
average U.S. household income. Furthermore, the data reveals that this income is earn d 
primarily from off-farm sources.  In fact, the average farm income for small family 
farmers is negative (USDA 2007).  Because these facts are likely to conflict with 
people’s initial beliefs, we hypothesize that the provision of such information will 
dampen support for small farmers (i.e., βSF with information < βSF without information). 
We also expect preferences could be altered when participants are given information 
about farm production. Given that small family farms only account for 28% of total 
agricultural output despite representing over 90% of all farms (USDA 2007), we 
hypothesize that this information may also cause support for small family farms to 
dwindle.  Finally, we expect that a person’s preference for farm policy will depend on a 
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host of attitudinal and demographic factors of the type that will be described in more 






METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
 
The company Knowledge Networks (KN) was hired to administer a web-based survey to 
their panel of respondents.  The KN panel is the only existing online panel that is 
representative of the U.S. population.  KN achieves this outcome by randomly recruiting 
participants using telephone (using both listed and unlisted numbers and using cell phone 
numbers) and other methods.  Panelists are provided with access to the Internet if the 
household does not have ready availability. Thus, the panel is designed to be a true 
probability-based sample of the U.S. population comprised of both Internet and non-
Internet households, all of which are provided the same equipment for participation in 
Internet surveys. More information on the panel, recruitment methodology, studies 
comparing the Knowledge Network panel to other sampling techniques, and a 
bibliography of published academic papers which have employed the Knowledge 
Network panel can be found at http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/.        
In July 2009, the survey was sent to 1,833 individuals in the KN panel 1,196 of 
whom completed at least a portion of the questions, implying a response rate of 65%.  
The sample size was further reduced to 1,120 people who provided answers to all survey 
questions we analyze in this article.  Characteristics of study participants were similar to  
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those of the U.S. population and can be found in Table 1.  The survey consisted of 
approximately twenty questions and took participants, on average, about 10 minutes 
complete.   
Each respondent was randomly assigned to one of four information treatments. 
Respondents in Information Treatment 1 (INFO 1) were given the definition of small, 
large, and very large family farms (based on gross farm sales) according t the Economic 
Research Service (ERS) classification system as well as the proportion of farms in each 
size category. For example, in the case of small family farms, we inform respondents that 
this group has gross farm sales of less than $250,000 and they represent about 90% of all 
farms. All participants received this information at a minimum. Those in Information 
Treatment 2 (INFO 2) were given the same information as those in INFO 1, and were 
also informed of the average annual household income for each type of family farm and 
the average percent of income from farm sources. For the case of the small family farm, 
for example, we told respondents that the average annual household income of a small 
family farm was $69,804 and that the average percent of income from fa m sources is 
0%. Participants in Information Treatment 3 (INFO 3) were given same informati n as in 
INFO 1, and were also informed of the percent of total agricultural output each type of 
farm produced.  For example, in the case of the small family farm, we inform participan s 
that small family farms account for 28% of total agricultural output. Finally, people in 
Information Treatment 4 (INFO 4) received all the information contained in the previous 
treatments: INFO 1, INFO 2, and INFO 3.   Thus, for each type of farm, the respondent 
was given the ERS definition, proportion of total farms, average annual household 
income, average percent of income from farm sources, and the percent of total 
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agricultural output. For a complete breakdown of information provided about small, 
large, and very large family farms, see Table 2.    
Our analysis primarily focuses on three questions in which respondents were 
asked to vote for or against three different policies. The three questions were: 
• Policy 1: Suppose the next time you went to vote, there was a referendum on 
the ballot to  increase the average annual subsidy paid to each sm ll family 
farm (those with less than $250,000 in gross farm sales) by << $90, $500, or 
$1000 depending on survey version >>.  If passed, the policy is expected to 
cost your household << $0, $100, or $200 depending on survey version >>.  
How would you vote on the referendum if your annual federal taxes would 
increase by << $0, $100, or $200 depending on survey version >> if the ballot 
initiative passed? 
• Policy 2: Suppose the next time you went to vote, there was a referendum on 
the ballot to increase the average annual subsidy paid to each v ry large 
family farm (those with more than $500,000 in gross farm sales) by << $90, 
$500, or $1000 depending on survey version >>. If passed, the policy is 
expected to cost your household << $0, $100, or $200 depending on survey 
version >>. How would you vote on the referendum if your annual federal 
taxes would increase by << $0, $100, or $200 depending on survey version >> 
if the ballot initiative passed? 
•  Policy 3: Suppose the next time you went to vote, there was a referendum on 
the ballot to increase the average annual subsidy paid to each small family 
farm (those with less than $250,000 in gross farm sales) by << $90, $500, or 
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$1000 depending on survey version >> and reduce the average annual subsidy 
paid to each very large family farm (those with more than $500,000 in gross 
farm sales) by << $500, $1000, or $2000 depending on survey version >>. If 
passed, the policy is expected to cost your household << $0, $100, or $200 
depending on survey version >>. How would you vote on the referendum if 
your annual federal taxes would increase by << $0, $100, or $200 depending 
on survey version >> if the ballot initiative passed? 
The questions were phrased as single-bounded dichotomous choice questions 
using a referendum format, which under certain assumptions provides incentives for 
people to honestly answer the question (e.g., see Carson and Groves 2007).  Across 
surveys, the cost to the individual was randomly varied between the values of $0, $100, 
or $200 and the average benefit to farms was randomly varied between the values of $90, 
$500, or $1000.  The dollar amounts were chosen in an effort to create a situation in 
which, at the median values, roughly half the people voted in favor and half against the 
policies, which has the potential to improve the standard error of willingness-to-pay 
estimates (e.g., see Alberini 1995; Kanninen 1993).   
We also chose the values to create one situation in which the cost to the individual 
was less than the average benefit to the farmer (i.e., when Xi=$100 and XSF=$90).  
Experimental design in situations such as this always involves a bit of art as 
determination of model efficiency requires knowledge of true preferences, which are 
obviously not known prior to survey administration.  We conducted an initial pre-test 
with about 60 individuals, and based on these responses, we modified the tax amounts 
charged to individuals.  In the end, our choice of dollar amounts appears to have been 
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appropriate, as across all surveys 52% voted in favor of policy 1, and as will soon be 
seen, the estimated standard errors of the key parameters are quite small. 
 Although answers to the three questions shown above form the foundation for the 
analysis conducted in this paper, the survey contained several other questions of interest.  
In particular, to analyze the determinants of the votes on policies 1-3, we also asked 
several Likert scale questions, which will be discussed in more detail in the following 
sub-section, and we also asked some demographic questions.  Finally, to provide a more 
general gauge of people’s support for farm policies, we asked a question about whether 
people favored or opposed the government generally subsidizing farmers, and this 
question was followed up with a question asking people to check a box to indicate the 
key reason for their support or opposition.   
 
Econometric Model 
The econometric approach relies on random utility theory, in that individual i’s utility for 
policy j is: 
(3) Uij = Vij + ei +εij  
where Vij is the systematic portion of the utility function defined in equation (1), ei is an 
individual-specific random error term added to account for the panel-nature of the data 
(i.e., each person answered three policy questions), and εij is an overall random error 
term.  
 Normalizing the utility of the non-passage of a policy to zero, the probability tha  
a person in favor of a policy is the probability that Uij > 0.  Assuming the εij are 
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logistically distributed, the probability that an individual’s vote is “yes” is the probability 
that Vij + ei > εij, which generates the logit model:  
(4) 	




  	. 
Maximum likelihood estimation is used to identify the parameters that best 
explain the choice data.  In particular, the parameters of the model are identifie  by 
maximizing the following likelihood function:  
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where yij is equal to 1 if individual i votes affirmatively on policy j. Because the 
likelihood function in (5) includes the random term ei, it cannot be evaluated directly, and 
as such we use we use numerical methods (simulated maximum likelihood estimation) to 
integrate the random effect term out of the likelihood function using the methods 
discussed in Train (2003). 
 To determine whether people’s responses differed by information treatment, we 
estimate equation (5) separately for each treatment –allowing all modeparameters to 
vary by treatment.  Then a likelihood ratio test can be conducted as follows:  
(6) χ2 stat  = 2{ LLFpooled – (LLFInfo1 + LLFInfo2 + LLFInfo3 + LLFInfo4) }  ~ χ2 (15) 
The test has 15 degrees of freedom – i.e., there are 5 parameters per model as in equation 
(1) and there are 4 models, 5(4-1) = 15.  If the calculated value in equation (6) is greater 
than the critical χ2 value with 15 degrees of freedom at the 0.05 significance level, 
27.488, then the null hypotheses that the model parameters are unaffected by information 
is rejected.  
 We also sought to determine whether people’s preferences differed by 
demographic characteristics and/or attitudes.  Because the model formulation is one in 
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which only differences in utility across yes/no votes matter, and because 
demographics/attitudes are constant for an individual, the only way for a demographic 
variable to affect behavior is to interact with one of the model parameters.  Take, for 
example, a variable such as gender, for which Frohlich et al (1984) and Andreoni and 
Vesterlund (2001) have found that females prefer more equitable distributions than men. 
To test such an effect, equation (1) can be modified as follows: 
 (7) Vi = β0 + β1Xi + βSFXSF + βVLFXVLF + βIA {|Xi-XSF| + |Xi-XVLF|} +  
       Genderi[δ0 + δ1Xi + δ2XSF + δ3XVLF +δ4{|Xi-XSF| + |Xi-XVLF|}] 
such that each of the parameters related to selfishness, altruism, and inequality aversion 
now shift by gender.  For example, testing δ4 = 0 will determine whether females’ 
aversion to inequality significantly differs from men’s.  While gender is a variable many 
have hypothesized to affect other regarding behavior, it is not the only demographic t it 
of interest.  As such we further augment equation (7) by including variables on income, 
age, political affiliation, education, ethnicity, geographic location, and farming 
background by similarly adding interaction terms between each demographic attribute 
and the policy payout amounts.  
 Variations in demographics often fail to provide much explanatory power, and as 
such, we sought to determine whether people’s voting patterns might also be explained 
by differences in attitudes.  To measure people’s attitudes towards various aspects of 
interest related to farm policy, we relied on Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) theory of 
reasoned action, which posits that an attitude toward an action is comprised of the 
product of an individual’s beliefs of outcomes of the action and an evaluation of (or 
attitudes toward) those beliefs.  For example, consider a person’s attitude toward
17 
 
government interference in market outcomes. To measure such an attitude, we asked 
participants to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed (on a 5-point scale, 
where 1=Strongly Disagree and 5=Strongly Agree) with the following two statements:  
1. The governments’ farm policies interfere with market outcomes. 
2. It is undesirable for the government to interfere in market outcomes. 
In this example, Statement 1 represents the individual’s belief about the extent to 
which farm policies represent government interference in markets while Statement 2 
represents an evaluation of that belief.  Thus, if an individual answered “5” on both 
questions, the attitude score would be 5*5=25, meaning he/she is strongly opposed to 
farm policies on the grounds that it interferes with market outcomes.   
Although one could have simply measured the attitude itself (i.e., do you 
agree/disagree that it is undesirable for farm policies to interfere with market outcomes), 
we felt that more heterogeneity in attitudes would be picked up by asking two separate 
questions.  Moreover, our approach allows us to decompose an attitude into its 
constituent parts to see, for example, whether one’s attitude toward government 
interference in market outcomes is a result of a belief that farm policies interfere with 
outcomes or whether people believe interfering in market outcomes is itself undesirable.   
In total, we asked 12 questions to measure people’s attitudes toward six issues we 
hypothesized to influence people’s votes on the three policy questions.  In particular, we 
measured attitudes toward using farm policies as they relate to: 1) preserving a traditional 
lifestyle of historical significance, 2) maintaining a secure supply of food for U.S. 
citizens, 3) preserving the beauty of rural landscapes, 4) reducing the unpredictability of 
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farm incomes, 5) interfering with market outcomes, and 6) causing high taxes and 
government spending.   
Summary statistics for each belief, belief evaluation, and attitude are presented in 
Table 3. People most strongly believe in the unpredictability of farm income (mean of 
4.083) and high levels of taxes and government spending (mean of 4.021). When looking 
at the evaluation of beliefs, however, people feel strongly about maintaining a secure
supply of food for U.S. citizens (mean of 4.322) and high levels of taxes and government 
spending (mean of 4.075).  When the beliefs and belief-evaluations are combined, we can 
see that people have the strongest attitudes toward taxes and government spending as it 
relates to farm programs and about farm programs providing a secure supply of food. 
 To determine the effect of such attitudes, we modified equation (1) as follows 
(8) Vi = β0 + β1Xi + βSFXSF + βVLFXVLF + βIA {|Xi-XSF| + |Xi-XVLF|} +  
         γ1Traditional Lifestylei + γ2Food Supplyi + γ3Rural Beautyi +  
        γ4Unpredictable Incomei + γ5Government Interferencei + γ6High Taxesi  
in which the constant term β0, which again measures the factors explaining a persons’ 
propensity to vote affirmatively that is not explained by variations in Xi, XSF, and XVLF, is 
allowed to vary with a person’s attitudes.  By testing γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = γ4 = γ5 = γ6 = 0, we can 
determine if attitudes significantly affect willingness-to-vote in favor of the direct 
payment policies.  
 By testing the aforementioned hypothesis, it can be determined whether attitudes 
significantly affect voting outcomes.  However, it is also of interest to determin  how 
important attitudes are r lative to people’s other-regarding preferences, β1, βSF, βVLF, and 
βIA.  Because the attitudinal variables are measured in different units than the dollar 
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payouts, one cannot simply compare the relative magnitude of coefficients to determin  
relative importance. To remedy this, we calculate standardize the coefficients by re-
estimating the model and replacing the original variables with their standardized 
counterparts (note: to standardize a variable, the mean of the variable is subtracted from 
each observation and this difference is divide by the standard deviation of that variable; 








We begin our discussion of the results by describing how people responded to a general 
question about support/opposition to farm subsidies.  In particular, respondents were 
asked “In general, are you in favor of the U.S. government providing financial support 
(i.e., subsidies) to farmers?” As shown in Figure 1, 66% of participants answered 
affirmatively.  This is quite a bit lower than the almost 85% of subjects approving f farm 
subsidies reported in Ellison, Lusk, and Briggeman (2009), which may be a result of the 
fact that the present result is derived from a nationally-representative sample of citizens, 
whereas the results in Ellison, Lusk, and Briggeman (2009) were derived from interviews 
in only three cities.  Another possibility is that the present result was measured in the 
midst of a prolonged economic recession that had yet to hit when Ellison, Lusk, and 
Briggeman (2009) asked their question in the summer of 2008.  Despite the somewhat 
lower level of support witnessed in this survey, the finding should not overshadow that 
fact that a large majority of respondents – almost two thirds – voice support for farm 
financial support. 
Following this initial question, respondents were then asked to check one box best 
representing the reason for their support or opposition to the government providing 
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financial support to farmers (the specific question asked depended on how the preceding 
question was answered).   The most frequent reasons for support were to ensure a secure 
supply of food for U.S. citizens (49.3% of supporters stated this as the main reason) and 
because farmers’ incomes are too unpredictable due to weather, price risk, etc. (26.4% of 
all supporters).  Of the 33.9% of respondents who were not in favor of farm 
subsidization, the most common objections were because farms should not be treated 
differently than any other business (32.7% of all opponents), people preferred less 
government interference in markets (21.6% of all opponents), and taxes are too high and 
all government spending should be cut (21.6% of all opponents).  Figure 1 provides a full 
breakdown of reasons for support and opposition. 
 
Preferences for Direct Payments to Farmers 
The raw data indicate that 52%, 22%, and 46% of people would vote in favor of Policies 
1, 2, and 3, respectively. These results indicate that participants are more likely to support 
policies which benefit small family farms (Policies 1 and 3) and are less lik ly to support 
policies benefitting large family farms (Policy 2).  
To provide a feel for the results and interpretation, results from the logit model, fit 
to responses from all three policy questions and pooled across information treatments are:  
(9) Vi = 0.5501 + 0.0104Xi + 0.0016XSF – 0.0007XVLF – 0.0008{|Xi-XSF| + |Xi-XVLF|}. 
These results indicate that as the tax burden (or loss of income) to the individual 
increases, the individual’s utility decreases.  That is, for every $1 an individual has to p y 
in taxes, utility falls 0.0104.  The results also indicate that although people are altruistic 
toward small farmers (0.0016), utility falls as subsidies toward large frms increase (i.e., 
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people want to reduce subsidies to large farms).  The results also indicate peopl are 
averse to inequality (-0.0008).   
Based on equation (2), and assuming very large farm subsidies remains 
unchanged (i.e., XVLF = 0), we can see that the maximum tax people would be willing to 
pay so that each small farmer would receive, for example, $100 is: [0.5501 + (0.0016-
0.0008)*100]/(0.0104 + 2*0.0008) = $52.51.   
 
Effect of Information on Preferences  
To determine whether information affected preferences for farm policy, we estimated 
logit models for each of the information treatments and compared the results to the 
pooled model. As can be seen in Table 4, most of the coefficients across information 
treatments and in the pooled model are similar in magnitude. The calculated Chi-squared 
test statistic is 23.802, which is less than the Chi-squared critical value with fifteen 
degrees of freedom of 27.488, meaning we fail to reject the hypothesis that information 
has a significant effect on voting outcomes.3  
It appears that those people who are more informed of farm incomes are no more 
or less likely to support direct payments than the uninformed.  Moreover, telling people 
that small farms account for a relatively small share of total farm output and th t they 
earn most their household income off-farm apparently had no effect on people’s 
willingness to support small farm subsidies.  Thus, while many people discount public 
                                                          
3 Because the scale of the error term is confounded with the parameters in discrete choice models, the test is 
actually a test of the joint hypothesis that the model parameters and the error variance is the same across 
information treatments.  Re-conducting the likelihood ratio test while controlling for relative differences in 
error variance would only serve to increase the liklihood function from the pooled model making it even 
more likely that the null is rejected.  Nevertheless, out of curiosity, we have estimated a heteroscedastic 
logit and found that information has no significant effect on error variance either. 
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opinion on farm policies based on an argument like “people don’t know enough about 
farms,” the results presented here suggest that informing the public has very little 
influence on their preferences. Given this finding, we pool the data across information 
treatments for the remainder of the analysis. 
   
Effect of Demographics and Attitudes on Votes 
Table 5 reports three different model specifications. Model 1 should look familiar, as it is 
the same pooled model reported in Table 4.  Model 2 incorporates demographic 
characteristics via interactions with the intercept term and the other paramete s describing 
other-regarding behavior. Very few of the demographic variables are significant at the 
5% level, which suggests such factors exhibit relatively poor explanatory power.  Model 
2 does have a marginally better percent predicted correctly (89.4% vs. 87.4%) and a 
higher pseudo R2 value than Model 1, and a likelihood ratio test shows there is a 
significant difference between the two models (χ2stat = 89.22 > χ2crit with 65 degrees of 
freedom at the 0.05 significance level = 89.18). We contend, however, that the likelihood 
ratio test results mean at least one of the interaction effects is significantly different than 
zero, so if there are only a few interaction terms (out of 65 possible) statistically 
significant, we would not consider Model 2 to be highly superior to Model 1. 
 Given the relatively poor explanatory power of demographic variables, we sought 
to determine if attitudes towards government interference, preserving rural beauty, etc. 
had a significant impact on preferences for farm policy. To address this issue, we tilized 
equation (8) where a person’s utility for a given policy is modeled as a function of other-
regarding behaviors as well as the person’s attitude toward preserving a traditional 
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lifestyle, ensuring a secure supply of food, preserving rural beauty, etc. This model 
(Model 3) can be found in Table 5.  
 As can be seen in Table 5, each of the attitude variables is significant at the 1%
level with the exception of the attitude toward preserving the beauty of rural landscapes. 
It is somewhat surprising that the percent predicted correctly by Model 3 was only 
slightly higher than that of Models 1 and 2 (89.5% vs 87.4% and 89.4%); however, a 
likelihood ratio test strongly rejects the hypothesis (and the P< 0.01 level) that the 
attitude interactions are all zero (i.e., Model 3 is strongly preferred to Model 1). Results 
for Model 3 indicate that if an individual has a strong attitude toward supporting farmers 
to preserve a traditional lifestyle, they are significantly more likely to vote in favor of a 
direct payment than someone less concerned about preserving a traditional lifestyle. 
Similarly, a strong attitude against government interference in markets decreases the 
likelihood of voting in favor of direct payments.   
 To compare the relative magnitude of the effect of attitudes and dollar payouts on 
voting behavior, we calculated standardized coefficients, which are reported in the last 
column of Table 5. Our results show a person’s attitude toward the unpredictability of 
farm income has the most positive effect on utility while one’s attitude toward high taxes 
and government spending has the most negative influence on utility. When looking at the 
dollar payout coefficients, we can see that the cost to self (or self-interest) parameter has 
the greatest influence on utility which is consistent with basic economic theory, but 
altruism and inequality aversion have an influential effect as well. It is important to note, 
however, that the dollar payouts in the other-regarding behavior model tend to have a 
greater impact on utility than changes in attitudes. For instance, a one standard deviation 
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increase in the subsidy to a small family farm increases utility by 0.6183, whereas a one 
standard deviation increase in a person’s attitude toward maintaining a secure food 








Discussions of farm policy tend to focus on how farmers and other agriculture-related 
businesses feel about specific farm support programs and the politics entailed i passing 
such policies. While it is true that farms and agribusinesses are most directly affected by 
farm policy, the opinions of those who pay the bill should not be ignored. Public opinion 
is an important input into the political and policy making process, yet almost nothing is 
known about public support for farm policies. The purpose of this paper is to develop a 
greater understanding of taxpayers’ preferences for farm policy using an economic model 
of other-regarding preferences as a structural framework. 
 Our results show that, in general, the majority of people (66%) are in favor of the
government providing financial support to farmers. Most proponents want to ensure a 
secure supply of food as well as protect farmers from the unpredictable nature of farming 
itself (weather, price risk, etc.). Opponents, on the other hand, object to government 
subsidization mainly because they believe farms should be treated like any other business 
and because of the belief that government should not meddle in market outcomes.  
Looking specifically at people’s votes on direct payments to farmers, we found 
that people would rather see funding go to small family farms rather than very large  
27 
 
family farms. Indeed, our parameter estimates suggest most respondents would be in 
favor of reducing payments to very large farmers either by reducing taxpayer’s burden or 
by redistributing farm payments away from very large farms and directing it toward small 
farms.  Importantly, this result was found even in cases where respondents were fully 
informed that large farms account for the majority of the farm output in the U.S. 
 One interesting result is that information had no significant effect on respondents’ 
preferences for farm policy. Even when participants were told the average household 
income of a small family farm was completely derived from off-farm sources, people still 
opted to support policies which benefitted small family farms over very large family 
farms. Because information on relative incomes and productivity did not significantly 
affect willingness to support direct payments, this suggests there are other fac ors driving 
voting behavior; a result consistent with our finding that attitudes toward issues such as 
preserving traditional lifestyles and protecting against riskiness ar ignificant 
determinants of preferences for farm payments. 
 Finally, we found that citizens do exhibit other-regarding preferences in rlation 
to farm policy. Although people care about their own well-being, they also act 
altruistically toward small family farms (but not toward very large family farms), and 
people exhibit aversion to inequality.  The other-regarding preference models we 
estimated, while inspired by existing models in the economic literature, have some key 
differences that seem to explain well our pattern of voting behavior as indicated by the 
fact that our models were able to correctly predict almost 90% of people’s votes.       
 While this paper provides new insights into taxpayer preferences for farm 
policies, there remains much to learn. Farm programs are only one component of the 
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USDA budget, and it may be useful to determine the importance of farm programs in 
relation to other budget components (such as food assistance, natural resource 
conservation, rural development, etc.), and to determine how information about current 
budget allocations influences people’s choices. Lobbyists, policy makers, and 
government officials are continually interested in public opinion, and we hope the results
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Table 1. Characteristics of Study Participants and Definition of Variables  
Variable  Definition     
Gender  1 if female; 0 if male   0.496 
Farming Family 1 if immediate family farms for a living; 0 otherwise 0.140 
College  1 if obtained bachelor's degree or higher; 0 otherwise 0.291 
Democrat  1 if Democrat political party; 0 otherwise 0.395 
Republican  1 if Republican political party; 0 otherwise 0.294 
Political Other 1 if Independent or other political party; 0 otherwise 0.312 
White  1 if of White ethnicity; 0 otherwise  0.761 
Income1  1 if annual household income before taxes is 0.472 
Income2  1 if annual household income before taxes is 0.356 
Income3  1 if annual household income before taxes is 0.171 
Age1  1 if younger than 35 years of age; 0 otherwise 0.254 
Age2  1 if age is 35 to 54.99 years; 0 otherwise 0.378 
Age3  1 if age is 55 years or older; 0 otherwise 0.368 
Northeast  1 if resides in Northeast region of U.S.; 0 otherwise 0.176 
Midwest  1 if resides in Midwest region of U.S.; 0 otherwise 0.210 
South  1 if resides in South region of U.S.; 0 otherwise 0.396 
West  1 if resides in West region of U.S.; 0 otherwise 0.218 

















Table 2. Comparison of Four Information Treatments         














Statement about Small Family Farms (INFO 1) (INFO 2) (INFO 3) (INFO 4) 
Gross farm sales less than $250,000 X X X X 
Represent 90% of all farms X X X X 
Average annual household income is $69,804   X   X 
Average percent of income from farm sources is 0%   X   X 
Account for 28% of total agricultural output     X X 
          
Statement about Large Family Farms         
Gross farm sales between $250,000 and $500,000 X X X X 
Represent 4% of all farms X X X X 
Average annual household income is $103,864   X   X 
Average percent of income from farm sources is 42%   X   X 
Account for 15% of total agricultural output     X X 
          
Statement about Very Large Family Farms         
Gross farm sales over $500,000 X X X X 
Represent 3% of all farms X X X X 
Average annual household income is $249,814   X   X 
Average percent of income from farm sources is 79%   X   X 















Table 3. Beliefs, Evaluation of Beliefs, and Attitudes of Study Participants   
Statement Mean Std. Dev. 
Beliefs†   
     Farm support programs preserve a traditional lifestyl  that has historical significance. 3.3205 0.9887 
     Farm support programs ensure a secure supply of food for U.S. citizens. 3.5759 1.0785 
     Farm support programs preserve the beauty of rural landscapes. 3.1527 0.9837 
     Farmers' incomes are too unpredictable due to weather, price risk, etc. 4.0830 0.8955 
     The government's farm policies interfere with market outcomes. 3.4063 0.8808 
     Taxes are too high, and the government spends too much. 4.0205 1.0789 
   
Evaluation of Beliefs†   
     Preserving traditional lifestyles of historical significance is desirable. 3.4518 0.9554 
     Maintaining a secure supply of food for U.S. citizens is desirable. 4.3223 0.9227 
     Preserving the beauty of rural landscapes is desirable. 3.6688 0.9195 
     Making farmers' incomes more predictable is desirable. 3.5679 0.8972 
     It is undesirable for the government to interfere in market outcomes. 3.3321 1.0006 
     High taxes and high levels of government spending are undesirable. 4.0750 1.0585 
   
Attitudes††   
     Attitude toward preserving traditional lifestyle of historical significance 12.0223 5.9218 
     Attitude toward maintaining secure supply of food fr U.S. citizens 15.8152 6.4526 
     Attitude toward preserving the beauty of rural landscapes 11.9589 5.5768 
     Attitude toward the unpredictability of farm incomes 14.8839 5.6215 
     Attitude toward government interference in market outc mes 11.7607 5.6400 
     Attitude toward high taxes and high levels of government spending 17.1964 7.3850 
N (# of observations)  1120 
   
† Means and Standard Deviations for Beliefs and Evaluation of Beliefs are based on a scale from 1-5 where 
   1=Strongly Disagree and 5=Strongly Agree   



















Table 4. Effect of Information on Logit Model Estimates


























(0.0770) (0.1695) (0.1600) (0.1583) (0.1396)
Self 0.0104†† 0.0137†† 0.0101†† 0.0111†† 0.0080††






















(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Inequity Aversion -0.0008†† -0.0013†† -0.0009†† -0.0006†† -0.0007††
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Log-Likelihood Function -1775.8940 -403.7231 -461.9828 -434.4630 -463.8239
Number of Observations 3360 846 858 831 825
Number of Individuals 1120 282 286 277 275
† Denotes 5% significance







Table 5.  Logit Estimates for Three Model Specifications
Parameter Model 1 Model 2 Model 3







0.0458 (0.3668) -0.2736 (0.1464) -0.6092
†† 
(0.0384)
   income<$50K
b
-0.0868 (0.2338)
   $50K<income<$100K
b
-0.0553 (0.2334)
   female
c
0.1224 (0.1580)
   democrat
d
0.2915 (0.1919)
   republican
d
0.1088 (0.2028)
   farming family
e
-0.1255 (0.2245)





   35<age<55
f
0.2191 (0.1873)
   college education
g
-0.1837 (0.1855)
   White ethnicity
h
-0.0227 (0.1982)
   Northeast region
i
0.4501 (0.2609)
   Midwest region
i
0.1729 (0.2357)
   South region
i
0.3701 (0.2121)










   Attitude toward preserving the beauty of rural landscapes 0.0047 (0.0085) 0.0264 (0.0475)















Cost to Self (x1) 0.0104
†† 










   x1*$50K<income<$100K
b
0.0026 (0.0014)
   x1*female
c
0.0011 (0.0009)
   x1*democrat
d
0.0013 (0.0011)





   x1*farming family
e
-0.0014 (0.0014)
   x1*age<35
f
0.0013 (0.0013)
   x1*35<age<55
f
0.0005 (0.0011)
   x1*college education
g
0.0020 (0.0011)
   x1*White ethnicity
h
0.0016 (0.0012)





   x1*Midwest region
i
0.0017 (0.0014)





Benefit to Small Farm (x2) 0.0016
†† 




















   x2*democrat
d
0.0002 (0.0003)
   x2*republican
d
-0.0001 (0.0003)





   x2*age<35
f
-0.0003 (0.0003)
   x2*35<age<55
f
-0.0002 (0.0003)










   x2*Northeast region
i
0.0001 (0.0004)
   x2*Midwest region
i
0.0004 (0.0003)
   x2*South region
i
0.0005 (0.0003)




Table 5. Logit Estimates for Three Model Specifications - Continued









   x3*income<$50K
b
0.0001 (0.0002)
   x3*$50K<income<$100K
b
-0.0002 (0.0002)
   x3*female
c
0.0001 (0.0001)
   x3*democrat
d
0.0002 (0.0002)
   x3*republican
d
0.0003 (0.0002)
   x3*farming family
e
0.0002 (0.0002)
   x3*age<35
f
0.0003 (0.0002)
   x3*35<age<55
f
0.0001 (0.0002)
   x3*college education
g
-0.0001 (0.0002)










   x3*Midwest region
i
-0.0002 (0.0002)
   x3*South region
i
0.0001 (0.0002)









   I*income<$50K
b
0.0003 (0.0003)
   I*$50K<income<$100K
b
-0.0002 (0.0003)
   I*female
c
0.0002 (0.0002)
   I*democrat
d
0.0002 (0.0002)
   I*republican
d
0.0002 (0.0002)





   I*age<35
f
0.0001 (0.0002)
   I*35<age<55
f
0.00003 (0.0002)
   I*college education
g
0.00005 (0.0002)
   I*White ethnicity
h
-0.0001 (0.0002)
   I*Northeast region
i
0.0002 (0.0003)
   I*Midwest region
i
-0.0003 (0.0003)
   I*South region
i
-0.0002 (0.0002)
% Predicted Correctly 87.4% 89.4% 89.5% 89.5%
Pseudo R-Squared
j
0.215 0.235 0.252 0.252
Log-Likelihood Function -1775.894 -1731.286 -1692.885 -1692.885
Number of Observations 3360 3360 3360 3360
Number of Individuals 1120 1120 1120 1120
† Denotes 5% significance, †† Denotes 1% significance
a
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors
b
Effect of annual household income relative to those making more than $100,000 per year
c
Effect of females relative to males
d
Effect of political party affiliation relative to Independents
e
Effect of having immediately family members who farm relative to participants with no family members who farm
f
Effect of age relative to people 55 years or older
g
Effect of having a Bachelor's degree or higher relative to participants with no college degree
h
Effect of White ethnicity relative to participants of non-White ethnicity
i
Effect of geographic region relative to participants living in the West region of the U.S.
j





Candidate for the Degree of 
 
Master of Science 
 
Thesis:    OTHER-REGARDING BEHAVIOR AND TAXPAYER PREFERENCES 
FOR FARM POLICY 
 
 




Personal Data:   
 
Education: 
Completed the requirements for the Master of Science in Agricultural 
Economics at Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma in December, 
2009. 
 
Completed the requirements for the Bachelor of Science in Agribusiness at 




Graduate and Professional Student Government Association, 08/2008-Present 












Name: Brenna Ellison                                                       Date of Degree: December, 2009 
 
Institution: Oklahoma State University                      Location: Stillwater, Oklahoma 
 
Title of Study: OTHER-REGARDING BEHAVIOR AND TAXPAYER 
PREFERENCES FOR FARM POLICY 
 
Pages in Study: 39                     Candidate for the Degree of Master of Science 




Changes in the structure of agriculture have led some to rethink the purpose and nature of 
farm support programs. One key piece of information missing from the debate is 
evidence on taxpayer support for farm programs. Using data from a survey of over 1,100 
randomly selected U.S. citizens, we determine how people would vote on particular farm 
policies and identify the determinants of support/opposition to farm programs. Our 
modeling approach makes use of developments in behavioral economics, which seek to 
explain other regarding behavior on the basis of altruism and inequality aversion. Our 
results show the majority of people (66%) support the subsidization of farmers, but 
voting outcomes are sensitive to the costs of the policy to the taxpayer as well ath  
magnitude of the payouts to famers. We find people act more altruistically toward sm ll 
farms than very large farms and that people are averse to inequality. Furthermore, we 
found that the public’s attitude toward maintaining a secure food supply and general 
attitudes toward government spending are also a significant determinant of preferences 
for farm programs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
